Babe Ruthketball

Orlando trades off for T-Mac, C-Webb goes for Googs

I’m no quisling. I would never root against Team USA, cheer for Uncle Sam’s wakeup call, blow a dandy bugle back at Yankee Doodle. It wouldn’t help anyway.

We’ve watched this same Team USA men’s basketball lineup for a quarter-century now, doing nothing differently. A loss — to Germany on Monday or South Sudan next week or any other country not featuring LeBron James — won’t change Team USA’s outlook. They are out to sell sneakers, and only from a specific brand.

The shoes help. Dismissing Jaylen Brown’s choice of endorsement over Derrick White’s didn’t waylay Team USA, far from it, White’s feet are two of the few moving. Anthony Davis moves and Derrick moves and so does 34-year old Jrue Holiday, the last two moving in their 98th important game of the last nine months.

Saturday’s narrow win over South Sudan won’t affect this roster, it couldn’t, not with its habits. Team USA coach Steve Kerr’s five-man lineups have no choice but to include at least two-to-four players most familiar with playing the fourth or fifth-worst defense among their NBA team’s top five-man lineups.

Back home, Devin Booker and Anthony Edwards take plays off by design. Joel Embiid’s defensive ratings are boffo but Philly asks him to hold off from his fiercest strut, Stephen Curry hasn’t closed out hard since Andrew Wiggins cared about basketball.

Down double-figure points to South Sudan on Saturday, LeBron James frowns and claps and yells at the fellas to get it together in time for a comeback and immediately loses his guy on defense for an easy layup and nobody laughs, how could anybody laugh, ain’t as if they moved over. Even sainted Jayson Tatum, pure of Celtic heart, cannot be counted upon to hound opponents defensively.

The other teams? They’re good at basketball, have been for a while.

Each opponent is nearly each country’s All-Star team, same as Team USA, but these opponents are better units. Comparatively, not as many lineups featuring two tired two-way stars unsuccessfully maintaining balance with three superstar scorers. Talent is most important, but necessary is the unerring, don’t-think-about-it instinct to play hard. NBA players can’t compel this force unless they work with NBA teammates.

Team USA hasn’t looked down on its opponents in two decades, nobody is slumming here, the effort is sincere but the panic doesn’t drive Team USA to slide in front of cutters. Team USA’s players always have someone else to do that for them, but “someone else” is never on Team USA, only other All-Stars who have always had someone else to do that for them.

Worse, Team USA’s opponents built trust through intimacy and repetition. Every Other Summer’s Pick of Available American NBA Nike Stars haven’t a hope in hell against that strain of cohesion.

What Kerr’s group is left with are typical advantages, unyielding length, strength on drives, depth to win via attrition. Only equal to the sum of its parts and also the overwhelming favorite, defined with Saturday’s friendly in the balance, coaches Kerr and Lue and Few and Spoelstra clearing the lane for LeBron James to do whatever:

That’s this team, every Team USA, calling its shot. Babe Ruth when it hits, Mighty Casey when it slips.

Germany sends its best five on Monday, then the Olympics. Ready those flags.

ORLANDO AND ITS MONEY

Franz Wagner’s contract isn’t bad.

He may never make an All-Star team, Franz’ fit next to the two-pointery Paolo Banchero could either strike gold or sorghum, but five years and $224 million are not terms to freak out over. It stands out because Franz’ free agent class stinks.

There are always a batch of very good non-All-Stars making enormous money while not acting as salary cap millstones. The Brandon Ingram impasse implies this will end but I doubt it, the market typically pushes players to be paid more than they produce because there is always another NBA team among 30 ready to pay just as much, or more. Teams will care less about aprons with five-tool players in future free agent classes, there just weren’t a lot of Franz Wagners flying around this summer.

This five-year, $224 million contract is fine. A bad contract is the five-year, $17 million deal Magic GM John Gabriel signed Derek Strong to back in, you guessed it, 1999.

Strong was an undersized power forward, a 6-8’ish Xavier product whom I of course saw play in person selected in the second round of the 1990 draft. Five NBA teams released Strong before he signed consecutive minimum-scale contracts with the Orlando Magic in 1996 and 1997.

Strong served as Horace Grant’s reserve with nice touch, rebounding and earning trips to the line. Derek’s form was so good that he probably scanned better than he scored:

With Grant and others sidelined for much of 1997-98, Strong contributed a sterling streak to end an otherwise nowhere Orlando Magic season, averaging 13.8 points per game in March and April. Strong timing, it was a contract year, Derek was due cash whenever the NBA owner lockout ended. Took a while to end.

It was late January of 1999 by the time Strong and Orlando put ink to paper, a long way from last spring’s 13.8 points per game, yet the Magic kept the crew, the Magic needed to win now. Orlando hired 68-year old Chuck Daly to coach, re-signed Strong, aligned role players behind Anfernee Hardaway, tied for the best record in the East.

Tied with the best record in the East before — and this turned out to be a problem — bowing in the playoffs immediately in the first round to the 76ers.

Another problem was Strong’s minutes, which Daly cut in half in his contract’s first season. Derek earned $3 million for playing 695 minutes under Daly in 1999, only one appearance (Game 1, benched thereafter) in Philadelphia’s 3-1 opening round romp over Orlando. Another problem: Derek Strong was 31 when the Magic signed him to five-years and $17 million, all guaranteed, under a $30 million NBA salary cap.

Daly resigned days after the loss to Philly, the Magic traded Hardaway and Grant and other veterans, pivoting toward rebuilding ahead of a 2000 free agent class including Tim Duncan, Grant Hill, Tracy McGrady, Tim Thomas, Eddie Jones, and Austin Croshere.

Strong earned even less time in 1999-00 under rookie coach Doc Rivers, working only 148 minutes over 20 games. Yet Derek was the team’s third-highest paid player behind Darrell Armstrong and Armen Gilliam’s expiring contract. Just ahead of the final year of Chauncey Billups’ rookie deal.

The Magic traded for Billups before the 2000 trade deadline, knowing he would never play for Orlando after the shoulder surgery Chauncey underwent two months prior. The thought of making Billups a Magic For Life was never considered, Orlando needed Billups and Armen Gilliam’s and Yinka Dare’s and Ron Mercer’s expiring contracts in equal measures. Additionally, the club could not afford Strong’s 2000-01 salary (over $3.5 million) if it wanted to fit Duncan and Hill and Tracy McGrady into the fold.

The Magic’s salary cap could also not afford the three first-round draft selections the club was owed in the 2000 NBA draft: No. 5 (earned via 1993’s Penny Hardaway-Chris Webber trade) and No. 10 (earned from Denver in 1999, after Nugs GM Dan Issel traded for Keon Clark) and No. 13 (the Magic’s own pick).

To clear cap space, the Magic dealt Orlando’s own 2000 selection on draft night (23-year old Fresno State senior Courtney Alexander, drafted in matching suits with his son during the HEIGHT of our culture’s celebration of the ‘Mini-Me’ character) to Dallas for a lottery-protected first-rounder in 2001 (Brandon Armstrong, the guy who does those impressions).

Dallas also sent Orlando $3 million cash from Mark Cuban and a 2000 second-rounder (Dan Langhi), the Magic candied Alexander’s $1.32 million first-year salary off the cap.

Orlando kept No. 5, choosing Rookie of the Year Mike Miller. But Orlando sent the No. 10 pick (Keyon Dooling) plus second-year swingman Corey Maggette and probably Cuban’s cash to the Clippers in exchange for the Clippers accepting the three-years and $11.57 million remaining on 32-year old Derek Strong’s deal. Plus Dan Langhi.

(The Magic received a 2006 first-round pick in the transaction, Orlando traded it to Denver in 2002 to trim luxury tax, the Magic swabbing Don Reid’s $1.1 million contract off the books. The pick became Marcus Williams.)

Dooling, the 20-year old Maggette and Clipper No. 18 selection Quentin Richardson joined No. 3 Clipper pick, Darius Miles:

This was Charles’ second post-retirement appearance on ‘Inside the NBA’ but his first “ho-lee crap” connection. It was a startling moment, clearly energizing two-year Turner veteran Kenny Smith, who already knew he would pair with Barkley in next season’s iteration of the show.

In 2000 the Magic signed Grant Hill and Tracy McGrady and nearly Tim Duncan, but in 2003 the Magic traded Mike Miller for Drew Gooden. Q-Rich and Keyon Dooling each played several seasons for the Magic later in their careers. Derek Strong worked 28 games with the Clippers before the club waived him, the Clippers paid Derek over $8 million not to play basketball between 2001 and 2003, so he didn’t.

THOSE WARRIOR TRADES

There were a lot of them in the 1990s.

Webber-to-Googs-to-Donyell Marshall was a Clapton-to-Beck-to-Page, but only during their appearances on the ARMS Tour:

Yeesh.

The Warriors had RUN TMC — Tim Hardaway, Mitch Richmond and Chris Mullin in irrespective order — until Warriors GM/coach Don Nelson traded Richmond (a Hall of Famer) for 1991 No. 3 draft pick and presumed point forward superstar Billy Owens.

Billy was so-sOwens with the Warriors but Nellie made up for it with prime Sarunas Marciulionis. The 1991-92 Warriors won 55 games, fourth-best record in the NBA, Nellie picked Latrell Sprewell with the No. 24 pick in the 1992 draft.

Mullin and Owens and Hardaway missed many, many games the next season: Golden State won but 34 times in 1992-93 yet jumped in the lottery from No. 7 to No. 3. A position whereupon Nellie could hone in on another prized prospect, presumably one in better shape than Billy Owens.

Nellie wasn’t satisfied with No. 3, however, and cooed over Chris Webber, the priciest pup in 1993’s litter.

Nellie’s problem was Pat. Pat Williams was about to win the lottery for a second spring in a row.

The 1992 lottery sprung Pat the jumpiest puppy on the block: Shaquille O’Neal.

Williams’ Orlando Magic won 41 times in 1992-93 yet lottery-propped from the presumed No. 10 pick to No. 1, a literal one-in-66 shot come true:

To use a phrase familiar to the era, Chris Webber was Billy Owens on steroids, the draft’s lead prospect. Nellie had to have Chris in the middle, which would turn into trouble.

Working two years before a rookie salary cap strung novice salaries in order, Pat Williams passed on pairing C-Webb’s demands (Webber’s first contract inked for 15 years and $74.4 million) with Shaquille O’Neal’s rookie contract (seven years and $39.9 million). Instead, Pat set up a swap we’ll never see again.

The Warriors — Nellie — dealt Golden State’s unprotected 1996, 1998 and 2000 first-round picks to Orlando for the right to move up two spots in the 1993 NBA draft.

Three picks for the difference between Webber and No. 3 selection Anfernee Hardaway (7-6 Shawn Bradley was selected No. 2 by the 76ers, he wore uniform No. 76). Penny signed a reported three-year, $65 million deal but the rear-loaded contract only paid Hardaway $1.244 million in his rookie season, in 1994 Penny opted into a nine-year, $72 million contract.

Warrior guard Tim Hardaway tore his ACL a few weeks before the 1993-94 season, Webber’s rookie year, and to outsiders the 1993 Warrior offseason was one in 32 consecutive for which the Golden State Warriors failed to secure a palatable starting pivotman. Don Nelson, Warrior insider, counted Webber as a palatable starting pivotman, which was news to Chris Webber, who considered himself a power forward, not a center. And certainly not whatever the hell a “pivotman” is.

The C-Webb and D-Nell relationship fell out in 1994 despite Webber winning Rookie of the Year. Nellie dealt Webber to Washington at the dawn of 1994-95 for Tom Gugilotta and picks: Washington’s 2000 first-rounder plus the re-acquisition of the 1996 and 1998 first-round picks Golden State sent to Orlando in the Chris Webber deal, which Washington briefly owned.

Earlier in the 1994 offseason Orlando attached two of the three Golden State first-rounders to Scott Skiles’ contract and Washington took the bait, but only after the Bullets struck out in attempts to sign free agent guard Brian Shaw. With Skiles off Orlando’s books, the Magic used the cap space earned from Washington to sign Horace Grant from Chicago and also, cruelly, add Brian Shaw.

"[Skiles] has been an important piece of the Orlando Magic's foundation, and he always will be," John Gabriel, Orlando's vice president of basketball operations, said of the point guard. "No player has meant more to success to the Orlando Magic since its inception than Scott Skiles."

… but we really need a big forward and size in the backcourt.

Similarly, Shaw really wanted to with the Magic, turning down better money from the Knicks and Bullets, working for $690,000 in his first year with Orlando. From Shaw’s agent, via Sports Illustrated:

JULY 28, 5 P.M.: [Brian Shaw] tells how much he wants to play in Orlando. "Get me there, winning is most important. I will make my money." When player is that clear, all you can do is execute his directive.

JULY 28, 5:30 P.M.: [John Gabriel] calls—decides not to have us call [Washington GM John] Nash. Says that he feels guilty for having [Shaw] blow off someone who wants him so much. I sit on Washington phone calls, do not accept them.

The agent blabbed about lying to Washington on Brian Shaw’s behalf in Sports Illustrated!

Golden State re-acquired its 1996 first-round pick in time to answer another call for a big, burly center (Todd Fuller), and re-acquired the 1998 first-rounder to splurge on Nellie favorite Antawn Jamison.

Of course, Nellie was gone for each of these selections, fired in 1995.

Golden State did little with Fuller or Jamison or 40 games of Googs. At the the 1995 trade deadline Gugliotta was dealt from Golden State to Minnesota (where he’d become an All-Star) for Donyell Marshall.

In 2000 Golden State swapped Washington’s 2000 first-rounder (earned with Googs/Marshall and Fuller and Jamison in exchange for Webber) to Chicago for Larry Hughes. Philly plucked Toni Kukoc in the three-team deal, possibly initiated because Bulls GM Jerry Krause wanted the rights to what shoulda been brand new Wizards GM Michael Jordan’s first first-round draft pick.

Lottery air blew No. 7 on the Washington-to-Warriors-to-Bulls ball, Chicago drafted Chris Mihm and traded the 7-footer to Cleveland for No. 8 selection Jamal Crawford and cash.

Webber in Washington, we know about.

The Magic, meanwhile, made the 1995 NBA Finals under the direction of Hardaway, Penny was a very close second to Webber in Rookie of the Year voting. The 2000 first-rounder owed from the Warriors turned into the No. 5 selection and Rookie of the Year Mike Miller.

Pat Williams was sometimes very lucky. Way more often, Pat Williams was very good.

OH ME OH MY

Nothing sounds better than this Tristan and Gustav excepting, of course.

NEXT: Larry Bird a Blazer, Knicks noogie the Nets, Scottie Pippen tells it like it is.

Thank you for reading!