Nine teams passed on Paul Pierce
Boston acquired Paul Pierce with the tenth selection in 1998’s NBA draft and it was inexplicable then just as now. Nine different teams thought they’d selected the top overall prospect and only Dallas’ gamble was correct.
The draft wasn’t a cautionary tale, nobody was in on a fad for a particular type of player, each of the dice rolls were on orthodox solutions. There was the pivotmen with touch, a lithe Pippen-project, a coach’s kid point guard and a Big Ten double-double machine. There were 20-point scorers and a talented headcase with off-court issues. The weirdest choice was Dirk Nowitzki, and he panned out the shiniest.
Pierce’s potential rang second. A high school stud and three-year starter at Kansas, Paul wouldn’t turn 21 until his first training camp. Everyone liked him but everyone thought they could do one better.
“I don’t think a lot of the top guys will become stars,” said then-Pacers scout, former general manager, and future Pistons coach George Irvine.
“Pierce will be a good player, [Michael] Olowokandi will be a good center. But there’s no one like Kevin Garnett or Grant Hill or Tim Duncan. Those guys make a difference for your franchise. I think these guys will be good, solid players, but I don’t know if any will ever be All-Stars.”
The goal of every GM in the top ten was to divine a finer prospect than Pierce. Let’s try to make sense of each of the whiffs.
THE CLIPPERS’ REASON
Phil Jackson swore Jerry Krause preferred Olowokandi to Tim Duncan in 1998. Duncan is a full year younger than Michael Olowokandi, a giant whose three-year career at Pacific represented the extent of his organized basketball experience.
Olowokandi didn’t touch a basketball until the movie ‘White Men Can’t Jump’ charmed him when he was 17, yet he only dabbled recreationally. Olowokandi was a mechanical engineering major at university when, on his 20th birthday, he decided to head to the library and pull out a random book listing American colleges.
A resident of London, he had decided he wanted to play American college basketball, but he had never played an organized game of basketball in his life and had no idea where to start looking for a basketball school.
Peterson’s, the 3,000-page collection of more than 2,000 colleges in the United States and Canada, seemed like a reasonable place to start, although he didn't really know what he was looking for.
“I just opened the book, and it opened up to Pacific,” said Olowokandi.
Pacific was out of scholarships, so Olowokandi footed the $23,000 tuition bill on his own before flying over:
Michael Olowokandi, a 7-foot-1 Nigerian-born Brit who traveled halfway around the world to join Pacific, had never played basketball. He didn’t know what a backcourt violation was. Didn’t understand man-to-man defense. Didn’t know the fouling system.
“He was horrible,” [Pacific assistant coach Tony] Marcopulos says, “the worst player I’d seen in my life.”
He would catch passes as if someone had tossed him an egg. He understood no rules and could execute no plays.
This was Olowokandi's first practice. He was 20.
“Go to the low post,” Marcopulos said, “and let’s see what you can do.”
The well-mannered giant was befuddled.
“Where’s that?” he asked.
Olowokandi paid for his own scholarship during his sophomore season, too.
Olowokandi did dominate the Big West in his junior season, he was tall and about to turn 23 and this was enough to consider a draft declaration a good idea:
“He’s the only center prospect out there,” [Marty] Blake said. “But he’s a couple years away. He hasn’t played that much. He could go number one. You need a center and he has potential. He has improved tremendously and there are no other centers.”
Not a ringing endorsement from the NBA’s recognized in-house scout, but religion was different in the 1990s. One B-level center was better than any A-level swingman or point guard, the book said, because of the way the game was called.
The problem the padres forgot was that you couldn’t mold an average grade into an A-level student, beatific bigs (Ewing, Robinson, Shaq, Zo, even Smits and Dream) all came out of college mostly formed. An average center in 1998 meant something like Luc Longley, and you’re only happy to grab an Expected Longley in the middle of the draft, not in the lottery, not Numbuh One.
The lottery was certainly not a place for a prospect who was probably burned out on his studies.
The NBA’s owners locked the players out a week after the 1998 draft, Olowokandi spent time at Pete Newell’s camp but fell out of shape as the lockout turned fall into winter. Kandi inked a stopgap deal with Kinder Bologna the day before the lockout ended, that club released him from his potential three-year contract after a month, citing poor conditioning.
The deal bound Olowokandi to Kinder until Feb. 15, but a club source said the team decided to let him go now to save money and because he had failed to make the expected impact.
Knee surgery due ended Olowokandi’s eventual rookie season with the Clippers, a club who employed five head coaches in the five seasons (9.9 points, eight rebounds, 1.6 blocks) he spent with the team.
Deep into that rookie year, even with Pierce, Vince Carter, and Dirk’s ascension, Laker exec Jerry West cited Olowokandi as the draft’s best prospect, only Nowitzki trailing behind.
He had talent, nobody thought he’d bail like he did. Even if it makes total sense now.
THE GRIZZLIES’ REASON
Bibby’s ascension wasn’t unlike that of Andrew Bogut’s in 2005, a conventional prospect and probably a bit of a pillock but what are you going to do, not take them?
Bibby owned a strong chance at the top pick after the lottery before Kandi Fever took hold, essentially hoarding Pierce’s should-be spot as this draft’s first can’t miss.
And, like Pierce, Bibby turned out almost as anticipated, a potent if not overwhelming offensive force. We didn’t think he’d get super jacked.
Has to be a Photoshop. Mike Bibby has never trended.
Grizz GM Stu Jackson used a lottery pick on point guard Antonio Daniels the year before at No. 4, an appropriate selection according to Win Shares. Hours after selecting Bibby, Jackson dealt Daniels to San Antonio for 24-year old rookie Felipe Lopez and 32-year power forward Carl Herrera.
Alex Rodriguez is flirting with Ben Simmons’ personal assistant behind the bleachers but we talk about Carl Herrera here:
DENVER’S REASON
Here is where Pierce’s arc goes wacky.
Denver had the worst record in the NBA yet fell to third in the draft. The team’s No. 5 overall pick from the year prior, center/forward Tony Battie, was mocked as “El Busto” by Nugget legend and radio talk show host Dan Issel throughout Battie’s rookie campaign.
After 1997-98 concluded Denver hired Nugget legend and ex-radio talk show host Dan Issel as general manager, with El Busto still on the roster. Issel needed to draft a big man so that he could trade Battie before the lockout and never have to meet him face to face.
The Nuggets had two picks in the first round and sought Olowokandi, who reportedly dunked a medicine ball 35 times (a Nugget … record?) in his thin-air, Denver workout.
Issel kept his spot in the draft, reaching for need. A multi-tooled offensive big man, not unlike himself, in Raef LaFrentz.
And Raef’s father Ron, who is not Art Donovan:
“I liken him to Adam Keefe.” — Rick Majerus, TNT draft analyst
Strong start.
That night Issel traded Battie and his other first-rounder (Tyronn Lue) to the Lakers for Nick Van Exel. The team signed Antonio McDyess in the offseason and didn’t think it had a hole at small forward with Eric Williams (20 points per game before injury) set to return from an ACL tear. Instead, Williams flopped as a two-way player post-surgery and LaFrentz never found an NBA fit.
NVE-Pierce-McDyess (with Danny Fortson as trade bait) under rookie coach Mike D’Antoni would have been nice.
What happened?
Issel fired D’Antoni after one season and took over as coach in 1999. In 2000 (after El Busto held LaFrentz to 0-7 shooting in a loss) the coach took a player protest on the chin. The team nearly held out of practice before relenting:
[Reports] indicated the players were protesting Issel’s apparent tirade against center Raef LaFrentz.
“It was just a constant negative environment. I’m not one of those players who blows up every time I’m disciplined. I’ve been disciplined my entire life. My father dealt with me a lot like Dan deals with me. But, in the game of basketball, you can’t play effectively constantly looking over your shoulder and constantly be upset about the situation you’re in because of outside influences. I know Dan just wants to get the most out of me he can. But he tears me down as a person.”
Issel “is a person who everybody in this locker room looks to for leadership. And, this year, Dan hasn’t really been in a good mood very much. When he walked in the room, we all kind of freaked, waiting to see what he was upset about today.”
Later that season Dan was suspended and eventually let go after calling a fan a racial slur:
And after all he’d done to encourage multilingualism.
GOLDEN STATE AND TORONTO’S REASONS
Toronto and Golden State were up next with the fourth and fifth picks and they chose Antawn Jamison and Vince Carter, who would soon be traded for one another along with a bit of cash sent from Golden State to Toronto.
On TNT’s draft broadcast Pete Vecsey reported Dallas as the impetus behind the deal, relaying Dallas coach Don Nelson as enamored with Jamison and ready to deal for the No. 4 slot. Shook, Golden State GM Garry St. Jean sent as much cash as he could to Toronto GM Glen Grunwald, ensuring the Raptors would draft Jamison for the Warriors.
Jamison was expected to be exactly what he turned out to be, a dynamite scorer who wasn’t ever full enough of the other things you needed (defense, playmaking) from whatever forward position you assigned him. Many considered Jamison’s potential greater than Pierce’s, yet Antawn had just as many detractors debating how freely an 80s-styled in-between scorer would fare in the next century.
Carter’s ball-handling was considered severely deficient, his jumper not on par with Pierce’s, his time at Carolina rather underwhelming in comparison to No. 3 pick Michael Jordan’s go-to final two seasons as a Tar Heel. Less of a sure thing than Pierce, for certain, until individual workouts began and pro teams could finally recognize the handle and outside stroke Tar Heel coaches Smith and Guthridge helped obscure.
After those workouts, Carter was never getting past Toronto. Although technically he did.
MILWAUKEE’S REASON
The Mavericks’ owned the No. 6 pick and Vecsey reported there was “no way” the Mavs’ owner at the time (Ross Perot Jr.) would allow Don Nelson to take a teenaged project with eligibility concerns (so severe that Sports Illustrated didn’t even list Dirk in Jackie MacMullan’s mock draft) at No. 6. Rumors had Milwaukee moving up to take Dirk, not Robert Traylor.
Traylor flipped things. The Michigan forward had yellow flags all over him but the NBA didn’t care that Traylor may have earned a bit of cash while at college, the league was dubious about his height, and weight.
And the Bucks were rudderless.
After general manager (and ex-general manager/head coach) Mike Dunleavy’s contract ran out Bucks owner Sen. Herb Kohl let head coach (and now general manager/head coach) Chris Ford run his 1997 draft. Chris used a top-ten pick (Danny Fortson) to deal for center Ervin Johnson, not bad.
Two months after the draft Kohl kicked assistant coach Bob Weinhauer upstairs to run his team, relieving Ford as GM and insisting Weinhauer trade Vin Baker.
Baker was a svelte, 25-year old All-Star and his contract expired in 1999, Kohl thought it best to move Vin in spite of the two, primo, seasons Baker owed Milwaukee. Charged, Weinhauer dealt Baker to Seattle in a three-team deal a month before 1997-98 began, returning the much older Tyrone Hill and point guard Terrell Brandon.
The Bucks missed the playoffs in 1998 under Ford and Weinhauer but kept the pair in place through the draft, and the foundational move up to select Traylor.
The Bucks had all manner of options ahead of this draft.
Dallas’ 1999 first-round pick, a selection that turned into Shawn Marion, was available, and Milwaukee didn’t have a 1999 pick after Dunleavy traded it years prior for, as you’d guess, Elliot Perry. Steve Nash was the NBA’s most talked-about trade chip, and Nowitzki’s handlers were rumored to be smitten with Milwaukee and its prominent German population. Deals were out there.
Or, the Bucks could have fallen back on Paul Pierce, dealt Glenn Robinson, and paired Truth and Ray Allen nearly from the outset.
Kohl and Weinhauer sent Dallas the No. 9 and No. 19 picks, Kohl excising a second guaranteed rookie contract in the process, to move up three spots to pounce on Traylor, who had lost a few pounds:
“Traylor has dropped about 20 pounds since the end of the Wolverines’ season and 40 since he began conditioning drills with his team last fall. That impressed NBA scouts, who gave up any thoughts of linking Traylor to [Oliver] Miller and instead started linking him to Charles Barkley, who dieted his way to an imminent Hall of Fame induction.”
For the Bucks, the acquisition of Traylor was like Christmas and New Year’s Eve all rolled into one.
“I think we made a good choice,” said Bob Weinhauer, the Bucks’ general manager. “There’s no question we wanted frontcourt help, someone who can come in and command double teams.
“I think he’s going to be a good player for us.”
Chris Ford, on board:
“I was quite pleased Bob was able to consummate a deal and move up and get a player like Tractor. We now have a player who is a very good inside player, who is very adept at seeing double teams and passing out of double teams. That’s going to benefit our shooters.”
Questions hovered hounding Traylor’s height.
“No, I don’t have any concerns about that,” Ford said. “He’s been 6-8 forever and played against taller players.
“You can’t just look at his height. You have to look at his desire, his heart.”
Two months after the draft Kohl fired Ford (“Ford said he would have appreciated it had his dismissal not come just before the start of school”) and hired George Karl as coach, but the team hung unto Weinhauer until his contract elapsed.
Because Kohl hired Weinhauer so late in the 1997 offseason (Aug. 20) the GM’s contract didn’t expire until Aug. 20 1999, long after the offseason ran out of transactions to build through. Karl must have loved that.
“Just about everyone from seven on down wants to trade their pick,” then-Pistons GM Rick Sund, owning the No. 11 selection, said before the draft.
“But there’s nothing to be gotten for those picks.”
Of course, Sund couldn’t conceive in a million years seven teams would create so many excuses to pass on Paul Pierce. And by the next pick it was apparent that nobody had plans for Paul.
SACRAMENTO’S REASON
Jason Williams wasn’t supposed to go this high.
Word was Orlando would chance on J-Will with the 12th or 13th or 15th picks, deep in the lottery, and among the draftees Jason’s was the name most brought up in trade rumors.
Williams’ selection was the major surprise, a lottery talent dogged by off-court troubles, he wasn’t invited to the NBA’s green room. He was let go from Florida in February:
While the violations went unspecified by UF officials, sources from the school and the NBA said Williams had failed a random drug test for marijuana and was back in academic jeopardy.
[…]
Since the transfer, Williams quit the team once, was forced to pass 18 hours of classes last summer and was hit with three suspensions for team or school violations, the last of which officially ended the Jason Williams saga at Florida.
“It's an unfortunate situation, but he has no one to blame but himself,” [Florida coach Billy] Donovan said. “Was he worth the trouble? I don’t look at it that way. Our coaching staff can look at ourselves in the mirror and know the University of Florida did everything possible to help this kid - and that’s why you’re in athletics.”
[…]
[Donovan] stuck out his neck for Williams by agreeing to allow the academically troubled player to transfer from Marshall, where Donovan had coached Williams to 1996 Southern Conference freshman-of-the-year honors.
[…]
“Jason’s a very gifted athlete. He’s got NBA skills,” said Gary Brokaw, director of scouting for the Orlando Magic. “The only question is, what are his priorities? Does he have his life together?”
Williams turned 23 ahead of his first training camp and hadn’t proven himself capable of keeping the reins of a mid-level Florida Gator team for two-dozen contests. How was he going to handle 82 games in an NBA city?
The Kings didn’t even hire a coach, Rick Adelman, until three months after the draft. And Chris Webber, dealt to Sacramento a month before the draft, did not want to be there:
“This is one situation where time will not heal. Time will not make anything better. Time is just a means to an end. Time, in this situation, is a means to a definite, unadulterated, non-negotiable end.”
Kings GM Geoff Petrie sat tight. Webber had to report. The Kings were sure scoring small forward Predrag Stojakovic would make his NBA debut sometime in late winter, and Laker GM Jerry West still wanted Williams as much as Petrie wanted J-Will on the Kings. This shared value estimation, plus Peja, likely moved Petrie to pass on Pierce.
Williams would go on to several pot busts in the NBA, despite taking part in the NBA’s orientation program:
The TNT crew began to discuss Pierce’s fall after the Williams selection.
Hubie Brown relays Magic Johnson’s fawning appreciation for Magic’s recent workout partner, Brown chiding those doubting Pierce’s “athleticism” in the face of launching abilities which benefitted Pierce to the tune of seven rebounds and six free throw attempts per game during his junior season.
It is delightful watching ardent discussion of Paul Pierce’s relative lack of hops and its mitigating influence in 1998 — 19 years before Paul Pierce retired from the NBA — in an era where Ike Austin was still a thing.
PHILADELPHIA’S REASON
Larry Brown may have taken Larry Hughes first overall, even with two Tar Heels on the board. Hughes’ seeming gifts — effortless handle, length at guard and superior hops — scanned superbly next to that of Allen Iverson, still struggling as ostensible Sixer point guard.
Hughes didn’t have a position, and the Sixers didn’t need a position, they needed a multi-tooled personality to grow alongside the single-minded AI. Philly thought it was drafting the best prospect available while selecting for need in the same spot, fantastic value at No. 8 unless Larry Hughes completely dogged it.
Guess what Larry Hughes did.
Hughes entered the league carrying a rather large burden but he also left the NBA as about the same player the Sixers drafted. Philly gave up on him after a year and a half, dealing Hughes a month after Larry’s 21st birthday for 31-year old Toni Kukoc, who also did not fit next to Allen Iverson because nothing ever fit alongside Allen Iverson.
DALLAS’ REASON
Dirk Nowitzki was not obscure. He was mentioned elsewhere in Sports Illustrated, he’d been on ESPN2, TNT and ESPN showed his clips all week. The attitude at the time had Nowitzki off to Milwaukee as part of a trade, never falling out of the top ten.
Dallas, in spite of Vecsey’s Jamison report, swore it never wanted anyone but Dirk:
The truth of the matter is, then-Mavs owner Ross Perot Jr. went to then-general manager Don Nelson wanting to find a way to move down in the 1998 draft so he could make a few extra bucks. Nelson engineered the pre-arranged deal with Milwaukee, but still had to sweat out the eventual scenario.
[…]
In sliding down three slots, the Mavs basically saved Perot [$1.4] million. But they still were able to cash in and get the man they coveted the most in that draft in Nowitzki, who has become the ninth all-time leading scorer in NBA history.
Rumors swirled pre-draft regarding a potential Nowitzki commitment to Kinder Bologna during the anticipated lockout year. Additionally, Dirk’s first NBA team would have to finesse the German military, historically no small achievement, as Nowitzki finished out his compulsory service. The Mavs also had to court the 19-year by July 1st, when the NBA locked out its players.
Dirk visited on June 30, Nellie had him the second he lit the grill.
Apparently, all it took for the Dallas Mavericks to land Dirk Nowitzki was a barbecue at the home of Coach Don Nelson, a game of one-on-one with Samaki Walker of the Mavericks and a trans-Atlantic phone call to his parents.
The 6-foot-11-inch German star announced yesterday that he will give up European ball to play for the Mavericks next season.
BOSTON’S REASON
Boston boss Rick Pitino thought he coveted Nowitzki on the sly, but pre-draft gabfests had Nowitzki falling no lower than Boston.
Pitino was keen to go through life with a defensive stopper at swingman, Boston had no designs on trading up and Pierce was never going to drop to No. 10, the C’s never worked Pierce out.
They did work Dirk out:
Pitino told Nowitzki to skip the draft combine. Nowitzki needn’t worry about impressing teams drafting in the mid-teens because he wasn’t going to slip beyond ten.
“I went home,” Pitino said this month, “thinking we had our guy.”
Boston, ecstatic, found themselves with Pierce instead.
Following the selection, TNT draft analyst Scott Hastings reported “league sources” reflecting Pierce as out of shape during workouts with potential employers.
“One player, uh, one source said he was soft,” Hastings relayed.
Hastings, currently a Nuggets color analyst, was embedded with Dan Issel’s Nuggets at the moment.
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